

Tab

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25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date:

30 MAY

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
building, Agency Post)

Initials

Date

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

See DCI's request.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,  
clearances and similar actions

FR

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)

NFAC-3530-80

**EYES ONLY**

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

29 May '80

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
building, Agency/Post)

Initials

Date

1. DCI

A. Lang

30 MAY 1980

2. B. C. Evans

3. ~~DDCI~~4. ~~B. C. Evans~~

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

The attached has been provided to D/OCO  
where it will be read by selected officers.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,  
and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

7E-13, Hqs.

Executive Secretary

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

★ U. S. Government Printing Office: 1979-281-184/8

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4

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ll

National Intelligence Officers

3 June 1980

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

ST  
6 JUN 1980

Attached are the talking points for our  
Sino-Soviet Estimate which will be considered  
at NFIB on Thursday, 5 June.

I will be present as will [redacted]  
[redacted] We are available  
for a prebrief at your convenience.

[redacted]  
NIO for East Asia

cc: DDCI  
DD/NFA

3 June 1980

BRIEFING NOTES -- SINO-SOVIET NIE

2

Origin of the Estimate

- Has been on the books for several years. Decision taken in house to look at Sino-Soviet problem in wake of Mao's death, presumptive removal of Brezhnev from active politics, and growing Chinese ties with US.
- Initial crack at drafting taken under Jim Lilley's auspices, but great difficulty in producing usable draft, finding suitable drafter.
- Drafting responsibilities finally undertaken by [ ]  
[ ] (prior to his retirement). Draft subsequently revised by [ ]

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25X1

Principal Conclusions

- Probabilities strongly favor continuity over change. Changes are likely to be minimal, but there is one chance in ten of larger changes toward either conflict or significant improvement in the relationship.
- China is likely to be the key actor if changes occur; nevertheless, forces keeping Beijing on its present track are powerful. Soviet leadership -- current and probable future -- interested in some amelioration of dispute, but not prepared to pay price for it.
- Soviets do not appear to have desire or intention to attack China unless severely provoked. Most likely trigger for conflict, should it arise, in Indochina.
- Significant moves toward rapprochement probably would be started by China. This unlikely, but present policy may not enjoy universal support. Overtures would probably follow Beijing's reassessment of international situation.
- US is central factor in calculations of both Moscow and Beijing. Chinese hope for wide range of US help (which Soviets fear) but would probably live with less than optimum.

SECRET

Community Views

- There were no serious disagreements in coordination and the Estimate contains no footnotes.
- DOD may ask that language indicating uncertainty of our judgments which appear at end of Estimate also be incorporated in Introduction (last sentence of para 2). We have not polled the entire Community on this minor change but would not resist addition of a clause -- "which reflects a considerable degree of uncertainty" -- after the first two words in last sentence of para 2.



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SECRET



Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

NFAC NOTICE  
NO. 1-28

NFAC N 1-28  
5 June 1980

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TITLE CHANGE

National Intelligence Council

Effective immediately, the title National Intelligence Officer for China-East Asia Pacific is renamed National Intelligence Officer for East Asia.



Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.  
Director  
National Foreign Assessment Center

Distribution "A" (1-6)

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Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

5 June 1980

Dear Professor Moskowitz:

I recently received a letter from Nat Thayer describing your interest in developing interchange between Harvard scholars and our analysts on Korea. As you might expect, we have been spending a good deal of time on Korea lately and while we always derive benefit through discussions with our associates in academe, your suggestion is particularly timely.

Nat may have told you about our conference on Japan this past April. Unfortunately, I am afraid we have neither the money nor time to repeat that experience. While I am not in a position to make a commitment, it might be possible to arrange a short informal program - say two days - in July with about five attendees from each side. If such a program has appeal, please let me know. Would it be better to meet here or in Cambridge? I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

National Intelligence Officer  
for China - East Asia Pacific

Professor Karl Moskowitz  
Assistant Professor of Korean Studies  
Harvard University  
2 Divinity Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1  
*SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES*

*THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY*

1740 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

April 29, 1980

STAT

[redacted]  
National Intelligence Officers  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John,

Last week, after lecturing at the Law School at Harvard, I was approached by Professor Moskowitz, who is an Assistant Professor of Korean Studies in the East Asian Law Center Professor Moskowitz/ [redacted]


STAT

asked whether or not it would be possible to arrange some sort of interchange between the Harvard scholars interested in Korea and the government intelligence analysts interested in Korea. I told him that I would send his name and address on to you. It seems like a good way to bolster morale among the agency hands and might also give them an opportunity of learning what is going on in Korean research among the universities.

Professor Moskowitz's address and phone number is as follows:

Karl Moskowitz  
Assistant Professor of Korean Studies  
Harvard University  
2 Divinity Avenue  
Cambridge, Mass. 02138  
Telephone: (617) 495-3451

Sincerely,

  
Nathaniel B. Thayer  
Director of Asian Studies

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Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

10 June 1980

NOTE FOR:

FROM : NIO for East Asia

Per your request, attached is the  
proposed travel for our staff.

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1

NEAC  
FOREIGN TDY TRAVEL PROJECTION  
1 July 1980 - 31 December 1980

National Intelligence Officer for East Asia  
(Office)

STAT

LAST AGENCY-  
SPONSORED  
TRAVEL

AREA  
VISITED

NAME

ITINERARY

DATE

PURPOSE

January 80

Mar-Apr 80

January 80

China, Southeast  
Asia

Indonesia, Philippines  
and North Asia

China, Southeast  
Asia

third quarter '80  
(for 3 weeks)

third quarter '80  
(for 3 weeks)

first quarter '81  
(for 2 weeks)

area familiarization

"

"

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1



**CONFIDENTIAL**

5 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/East Asia

FROM :   
NIC Admin Officer


SUBJECT : Foreign Travel Projection --  
1 July 80 - 31 December 1980

1. The attached form is to be used for any foreign TDY trips projected for the period 1 Jul 80 - 31 Dec 80. The D/NFAC has requested that you categorize the projected trips (see attached memo.)

2. The trips submitted on the 1 Apr - 30 Sep 80 Foreign Travel Projection for yourself to China and SE Asia and  to Indonesia, Philippines, and N. Asia should be included on the attached form for review.

3. May I please have your response by COB 10 June. The Acting Chairman, NIC will review all travel proposals.

Attachment



**CONFIDENTIAL**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NFAC NOTICE  
No. 22-1

NFAC N 22-1

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRAVEL

Present and anticipated Congressional restrictions require that NFAC manage its travel programs to fulfill the highest priorities. Effective with the last quarter of FY 1980, DD/NFAC will review all foreign travel projections on a quarterly basis, each time looking ahead 6 months. Projections should categorize foreign trips according to foreign travel elements in the outline below. The reports should reach DD/NFAC, through the NFAC Planning, Management, and Evaluation Staff, no later than one week prior to the beginning of each quarter. Individual office reports should be forwarded to PMES 30 days prior to each new quarter and include a short, explanatory statement of requirement for each foreign trip.

## A. Travel in direct support to analysis, such as:

1. Research trips in support of specific projects that are incorporated in D/NFAC-approved research programs;
2. Summer Replacement Program;
3. Coordination of memos with Embassies and Stations, when coordination by pouch or cable could not produce the desired result;
4. Active participation in or support to conferences/delegations dealing with primary areas of NFAC research and analysis;
5. Biographic research trips and publications procurement problem solving trips, when such trips are requested by Stations and Embassy officers managing these programs;
6. Contract monitoring;
7. Briefings/debriefings, especially when high-level foreign officials request briefing/debriefing services; when such activities are critical to the production of intelligence on priority areas or topics; and in other exceptional cases as warranted.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. Indirect support to analysis, such as:

1. Area familiarization;
2. Industrial/military orientation;
3. General biographic collection or publications procurement trips, except as noted in category (A) above;
4. Attendance at conferences, except as noted in category (A) above;
5. Collection/requirements activities;
6. Organized recruiting activities geared toward hiring specifically identified highly qualified candidates for professional positions.

These categories and the quarterly reports are designed to be valuable management information tools. Although we do not project domestic travel on a quarterly basis, when resources are limited or constrained by Congressional direction, both foreign and domestic travel may be restricted by category, with exceptions granted only by D/NFAC or DD/NFAC.

25X1

All portions of this notice are classified CONFIDENTIAL.

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.  
Director  
National Foreign Assessment Center

Distribution "A" (1-6)

## REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING

1. Title of Presentation & Nature of Meeting:

To participate in a meeting at the Foreign Policy Research Institute on the topic "Soviet-American Cooperation in the Northeast Asian Region". To lead an informal discussion at the meeting.

2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

3. Location:

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

4. Time:

20 June 1980, 0900 - 1700

5. Name and Position of NIC Requester:

Assistant NIO/EAP

6. Identified as CIA? Yes Agency-sponsored? No

7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx):

None

8. Classified/Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)

9. Other Pertinent Information:

25X1 APPROVE:  AC/NIC 16 June 80  
(Chairman, National Intelligence Council) (Date)

25X1 CONCUR:  17 JUN 1980  
(Coordinator for Academic Relations) (Date)

25X1 CONCUR:  18 JUN 1980  
*for* (Director of Security) (Date)



FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
3508 Market Street, Science Center  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104  
(215) EV 2-0685

William R. Kintner  
President

May 12, 1980

STAT

[Redacted Box]

I am writing to invite you to a one-day meeting in Philadelphia on June 20, 1980, on the topic of "Soviet-American Cooperation in the Northeast Asian Region."

We are hoping to gather a small and relatively informal group of American, Soviet, and Korean scholars, in order to discuss some of the more salient issues of peace and security in Northeast Asia in mid-1980. We believe that the fractured dialogue between Soviets and Americans on political-military issues has progressed to dangerous levels, and that a meeting such as this one may help to establish some measure of agreement between the participants on the nature of current security challenges in Northeast Asia, particularly on the Korean peninsula.

This meeting is part of the ongoing studies at the FPRI on security issues in Northeast Asia, and in contrast to other parts of our program, there will be no papers formally presented -- although several background papers by participants will be distributed beforehand as a basis of discussion, and certain participants will be asked to give introductory summaries of the situation -- and the proceedings will be entirely off-the-record. The agenda will focus on the current situation in the morning, and in the afternoon, we shall discuss emerging and prospective contacts for reducing tensions.

We believe that you could make an invaluable contribution to the proceedings of this distinguished group of 15-20 people. We would cover all of your travel costs, and if your travel arrangements required you to stay in Philadelphia overnight, we would cover the costs.

The program will begin on June 20th at the Foreign Policy Research Institute with the first session opening at 10:00 A.M., with coffee and doughnuts available after 9:00 A.M. We shall have a luncheon served, and continue with meetings in the

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
[redacted]  
page two  
May 12, 1980

afternoon until 5:00 P.M. For those who wish to remain, we shall have an informal dinner and opportunity to talk at leisure in the evening.

If you have any questions, do give me a call. I trust that I shall receive an affirmative response shortly.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

  
William R. Kintner

STAT

[redacted]  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.

WRK:deg

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE
TO: <i>NIO/EAP</i>		<i>12 June 80</i>
ROOM NO. <i>7E62</i>	BUILDING <i>Hyd</i>	
REMARKS:		
<b>FROM:</b>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.


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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

STAT

13 June 1980




Here is the item that I mentioned to  
you over the telephone on 13 June.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

STAT





IV. 6 Jun 80

INDONESIA

24 May 80

N 1

PKI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MARKS PARTY'S 60TH ANNIVERSARY

STAT

[Redacted] (Clandestine) Voice of the Malayan Revolution in Malay to Malaysia and Singapore  
1030 GMT 24 May 80

[First installment of statement of the Indonesian Communist Party Central Committee delegation in connection with PKI 60th founding anniversary: "Unite and Struggle for Democratic Rights and Social Justice for the People and for Complete Independence and National Liberation"--read by announcer]

[Text] On 23 May 1980, our beloved and highly respected Indonesian Communist Party [PKI] was exactly 60 years old. The birth of the PKI is not an isolated event. The PKI was founded through the objective demand of the Indonesian people following the success of the Socialist October Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia. Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary ideology for the liberation of oppressed people, has been merged with the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian working class. It was this process of merger that led to the founding of the PKI, a main force in the struggle of the Indonesian people for national independence and socialism. With the birth of the PKI, the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people began a new page in its history. With the full strength of the Indonesian people, the PKI went on struggling for a new, free and democratic Indonesia.

In these 60 years, the PKI, a revolutionary proletarian party, has firmly and unyieldingly held high the banner of struggle against colonialism, imperialism and feudalism for national independence, liberation, democracy and socialism. The PKI's 60 years were 60 years of struggle to realize the noble mission of history it is shouldering, 60 years of unyielding, heroic, revolutionary struggle. During the Indonesian people's struggle against Dutch colonial rule, the PKI led a national rebellion from 1926 to 1927 which shook the foundation of Dutch colonial rule and reflected the strong desire of the Indonesian people for independence.

During the occupation of Indonesia by the Japanese military fascists, the PKI, along with other patriotic and anti-fascist forces, carried out a heroic and courageous resistance. The struggle of the PKI and other patriotic forces played an active and major role in bringing about the declaration of independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. Indonesian communists wholeheartedly took an active part in the armed struggle, along with all the patriotic forces of the Indonesian people, to defend independence against the armed aggression of the combined British and Dutch colonialists.

From 1950 to 1965, during President Sukarno's rule, the PKI was an important force in the Indonesian people's efforts to continue the struggle for complete national independence in the political, economic, military and cultural fields as well as for broad democratic freedom for the people at that time. The Indonesian people also played an active and prominent role in the international arena, defending the right to independence of every nation against imperialism and colonialism in all forms as manifested in the 10 principles of the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955.

The course of struggle followed by the PKI is not a course strewn with flowers, but a complex one full of thorns and obstacles; a course that has been consciously adopted and followed with the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of the best sons of the Indonesian working class and revolutionary people. The imperialist, feudal and reactionary cliques of the country were scared to death of the PKI and hated it. They therefore tried all means and tricks to destroy it. During its long history, the PKI experienced three white terrors from the imperialists and the reactionary clique in the country which served them. The white terror committed by rightist generals was the most cruel and savage in the history of modern Indonesia.

Using the 30 September 1965 movement as a pretext, they carried out indiscriminate mass killings against hundreds of thousands of communists and noncommunists, ordinary men and women and even innocent children and babies. Hundreds of thousands of others were thrown into jails and forced labor camps, such as on Buru Island and other places, and persecuted and abandoned until death, or left to suffer for dozens of years. Some of them who had spent dozens of years in jail were brought to court and arbitrarily sentenced to death or given life or long-term imprisonment contrary to the elementary principles of justice. The purpose behind this was to justify the white terror as part of a plot by rightist generals to seize power.

But, in the process of the judicial proceedings and through undeniable facts, the generals' clique was exposed as the real culprit. They accused the PKI of attempting a coup d'etat to overthrow the government of President Sukarno, but they were the ones who secretly and cruelly killed the principal leaders of the PKI who supported President Sukarno. They seized power from President Sukarno and established a military fascist regime which dragged the Indonesian people into misery. They persecuted Bung [Brother] Karno, resulting in his death.

It was the rightist generals who committed treason against the president, the supreme commander, and abused what they called the supersemar [11 March order] of 1966 and forced the already screened Provisional People's Consultative Assembly to convene a session to cover their unconstitutional action with a constitutional coat. The Suharto military fascist regime carried out indiscriminate mass killings, persecuted hundreds of thousands of people without judicial process, arbitrarily revoked the most elementary nationality rights, trampled on human rights and social justice and on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Under dangerous and difficult conditions, the PKI Politburo Central Committee seriously assessed the historical experiences and studied the weaknesses and mistakes of the opportunist and revisionist PKI leadership, which allowed the counterrevolutionary force to deal a blow to and inflict heavy damage on the PKI and other revolutionary movements in general. Through self-criticism conducted in September 1966, the PKI Politburo Central Committee corrected mistakes and showed a way out by adopting a new PKI three-fold program as a weapon to defeat the enemy and win the revolution. The self-criticism, which restored the PKI to its revolutionary course, was a manifestation of the bold determination and unity of the Indonesian communists to stand up again to continue the revolution.

In November 1967, the PKI Politburo Central Committee formulated the new party program. Under the new program, the PKI analyzed Indonesian society and concluded that under the present circumstances, Indonesian society was regarded as a neo-imperialist colony, especially of the U.S. imperialists and semifeudalists. Based on this conclusion, the new PKI program determined the Indonesian revolution at the present stage as the people's democratic revolution, an anti-imperialist and antifeudalist revolution of the masses that is democratic in character. The program clearly designated the target of revolution, the task and course of revolution and the capability of the working class to lead the main revolutionary forces and other Indonesian revolutionary elements.

The new PKI program was a strategic guidance for revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals, patriotic small traders, fishermen and national entrepreneurs and other democratic groups in their revolutionary struggle for the liberation from imperialist, feudalist and bureaucratic capitalist oppression and exploitation.

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N 3

INDONESIA

The conclusion of the Politburo self-criticism and the new PKI program have shown the correct course and strategic tasks of struggle in all stages of the Indonesian people's democratic revolution. The conclusion will guide the Indonesian communists in their struggle. Meanwhile, new changes and developments at home and on the international scene have compelled the Indonesian communists to further assess more valuable experiences and designate correct policies and tactics for the implementation of the conclusion of the self-criticism and the new program in accordance with the prevailing situation and characteristics of the Indonesian revolution. By so doing, the complex and protracted revolutionary struggle will advance step by step toward certain victory.

Today the enemy continues to spread propaganda that the PKI has been crushed; but the PKI can never be eliminated because it has its strength and roots in the working people and soil of Indonesia itself. The PKI aspirations are identical to the aspirations, demands and fundamental interests of the Indonesian working people. The PKI stands and struggles along with the people for freedom and justice. The Suharto regime was installed through the power of arms and imperialist support from abroad. This cannot be denied. Although the generals in important government posts have been given a civilian cloak and their fascist military regime has been covered with what they called Pancasila democracy, the people themselves have been deprived of their democratic rights. Political parties and mass organizations, which had played an important role in uniting the Indonesian people during the struggle to win national independence, have been banned and dissolved.

*shut out  
banned parties  
7/12*  
The laws governing political parties allow only the Functional Group [Golkar] and two other political parties to exist. Resistance against this curb continues. The Golkar is a government political party and its management is strictly controlled by the rightist military clique. The two other political parties, the Indonesian Democracy Party and the Development Union Party, are under the control and strictly watched by the State Intelligence Coordination Agency [Bakin] and the Security and Order Restoration Command [Koukamtib]. They are restricted and under pressure in general elections and excluded from the cabinet, which is dominated by the Suharto military clique. Needless to say, unfair and undemocratic actions bring about resistance.

In facing the forthcoming general elections in 1982, the existing political parties and other political forces have already voiced their opposition to the Suharto regime's general elections law, which continues to adopt the old undemocratic election system that fails to guarantee the principles of a direct, public, free and secret ballot. One-third of the People's Consultative Assembly members will be appointed to represent the Indonesian Armed Forces, while a big majority of the people will again be deprived of their voting rights.

It has become obvious that, like the previous general elections in 1971 and 1977, the Suharto clique will continue to use force to suppress all forces and groups which oppose it in order to ensure the continuation of its power through the so-called general elections. Addressing a military commanders' meeting in Pekanbaru, Suharto once again strongly threatened the political parties. Under the pretext of protecting the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila, he warned political parties against adopting nationalism and religion as their party ideologies, alleging that they are against the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila.

It is obvious that the ban against the PKI and communism is a prelude to the dissolution and ban of political parties and other religious and nationalist-oriented groupings. This, in fact, is against Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of political parties to adopt their own ideology. This is also contrary to the Pancasila concept of Bung Karno, which unified the Indonesian People's diversified religious beliefs, tribes and ethnological origins.

IV. 6 Jun 80

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INDONESIA

Since the army is exploited by the Suharto regime as its principle tool to suppress the people and its elements are allowed to squeeze the people through large-scale corruption to enrich themselves, the army is hated and feared while its image is gradually dropping in the eyes of the people. In order to overcome this situation, the Suharto regime is launching a campaign of so-called integration between the armed forces and the people. However, despite this, dissatisfaction exists within the armed forces. Privates, non-commissioned officers and middle-ranking officers feel and know the deep ravine which separates their daily life from the luxurious life of corrupt generals. Likewise, there are also forces within the armed forces which are opposed to undemocratic policies and actions which are disadvantageous to the people's interests.

The dissatisfaction and anxiety among various groups in society continue to develop. They have made public appeals in their respective areas, sent representatives to meet with officials and members of the district and provincial assemblies, and have launched various daring and widespread campaigns against the Suharto regime's policies and actions which harm the people's interests. The workers demand higher incomes; guarantees for their pension and other social securities; oppose dismissal; demand freedom and democratic rights and the right and freedom to form organizations and stage strikes.

Pilots and the ground personnel of the Garuda Indonesian Airways have courageously staged protest demonstrations and strikes, fighting for the improvement of their welfare and against suppression and exploitation by bureaucratic capitalists. Since 1979, peasants in various districts have launched widespread struggles to defend, seize back and register their farmlands. The struggle of the peasants in Siria-ria in north Sumatra and in (Jenggawah) in East Java was a prominent manifestation of the awakening and resistance of the peasants. The growing resistance of the peasants reflects the fact that today, land ownership and exploitation of peasants by feudalists in rural areas is becoming serious.

The peasants and broad masses are now demanding that the basic agrarian law and the production sharing law introduced during the Sukarno regime in line with the demands of the peasants and other democratic forces, but frozen since the Suharto regime took over the government, be once again reinstituted. In order to protect and improve their livelihood, the peasants are demanding freedom to form organizations and the suspension of the [words indistinct] policy which prohibits political activities in rural areas. The fishermen are unceasingly launching their struggle against the exploitation of their marine source of living by foreign capitalists and monopolists.

Indonesian students are carrying out a continuous struggle, opposing the policy which denies freedom of assembly and political activities among students. The concept introduced by the Suharto regime on the so-called normalization of campus life and the formation of students coordination bodies has been continuously opposed by the students. Their raging struggle and awareness of their position and role as defenders of the motherland and hope of the nation reflect the aspirations of the Indonesian people. Various groups among the broad Indonesian masses, politicians and intellectuals are worried and restless. They are demanding an improvement in the country's worsening situation. They demand the adoption of a domestic policy which holds patriotism, democracy and national unity high and a truly free, active and anti-imperialist foreign policy similar to the one adopted and implemented during the Sukarno regime.

-y The Indonesian people oppose the Suharto regime's policy in aggressing against and annexing the East Timor Democratic Republic and trampling upon the rights of independence of the East Timor people. The Indonesian people support the struggle of the East Timor people under PRETILIN's leadership to defend their national independence.

IV. 6 Jun 80

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INDONESIA

The increasing foreign capital investments which have drained Indonesia's natural resources, the increasing amount of foreign loans; the spreading of bureaucrats' and new landlords' capital; the rampant corruption, such as the case of PERTAMINA and the Palapa [satellite project] the increasing gap separating a small group of rich people from tens of millions of poor people; and the increasing number of unemployed and semi-employed people, are all proof of the lies of Suharto regime's so-called development, which he said is to serve for the improvement of the national economy and the people's welfare. All these will become an objective factor and basis for the awakening of the Indonesian people of various groupings and strata of life to unite and fight for the democratic rights and social justice of the people, and for complete freedom and national independence.

*about armed struggle in present context.*

CHINESE NATURALIZATION, ECONOMIC POLICIES MEETING RESISTANCE

STAT

[ ] Hong Kong AFP in English 1346 GMT 5 Jun 80

[Text] Jakarta, 5 Jun (AFP)--Extremist groups have been stepping up anti-government activities in Jakarta, ANTARA NEWS AGENCY reported today. Political feelings in the city were running high with the increasing rumours accusing the government of having failed to carry its economic policies, the agency quoted Jakarta military command sources as saying.

(?Racist) movement have been on the increase with certain official quarters refusing to give citizenship cards to Chinese wishing to adopt Indonesian nationality under the current naturalisation scheme, ANTARA said. It was the first disclosure that activities opposing the government had been on the rise in Jakarta, the centre of political activity. Home Minister Gen Amir Machmud described the extremists as "madmen" who refused to admit the achievements in the political and economic fields.

Meanwhile the Jakarta evening newspaper TERBIT [as received] today carried complaints by certain Chinese in Bandung, West Java, who wanted to become Indonesian citizens. One had to pay up to 25,000 rupiahs (about 40 U.S. dollars) to obtain a certificate of good conduct from the local police station, the paper said.

The government has set August 17, Indonesia's National Day, as the last day for registration by those wishing to accept the naturalisation scheme. However, the scheme appears to have not attracted many Chinese to register themselves because they have to give bribes to the officials in charge.

YUGOSLAVIA'S VRHOVEC DUE IN JAKARTA ON 7 JUNE

STAT

[ ] Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 5 Jun 80

[Text] At the invitation of Foreign Ministry Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Josip Vrhovec is expected to arrive in Jakarta on Saturday [7 June]. Minister Mochtar said in Jakarta today that his talks with the Yugoslav foreign minister will deal with the internal problems of the nonaligned movement. He said Indonesia and Yugoslavia are among the founders of the nonaligned movement who are persistent in their efforts to maintain the movement's purity and keep it free from big power rivalry.

#### BRIEFS

NETHERLANDS ENVOY'S DEATH--Jakarta, 30 May (ANTARA)--The Netherlands Embassy announced Friday [30 May] that Netherlands Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Renardel de Lavalette passed away on 29 May. [Excerpt] [Jakarta ANTARA in English 0278 GMT 30 May 80 BK]

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VOMR CARRIES PART TWO OF INDONESIA CP STATEMENT

AT [redacted] (Clandestine) Voice of the Malayn Revolution in Malay to Malaysia and Singapore  
1030 GMT 27 May 80

[Second and last installment of 23 May statement by the Indonesian Communist Party Central Committee delegation in connection with PKI's 60th founding anniversary: "Unite and Struggle for Democratic Rights and Social Justice for the People for Complete Independence and National Liberation"--read by announcer]

[Text] At the end of 1979, the Suharto regime claimed that it had released the last group of Indonesian Communist Party [PKI] political detainees and were only detaining a small group of the Category A detainees who would be brought to court for trial. So far, it has always kept the number of political detainees and the location of their detention camps secret. Apart from this the regime continues to make new arrests and detain persons suspected of PKI activities as well as members of other opposition groups, including student activists.

The release of the political detainees by the Suharto regime was not out of goodwill or humanitarian consideration, but stemmed from political and economic difficulties at home and abroad. The release of the political detainees was carried out to win support among the Indonesian people and to reduce pressure against the Suharto Regime by political opponents from various groups, who also demand democratic freedom, and the guarantee of fundamental human rights and who oppose arbitrary arrests and detention, particularly of PKI political detainees, who were detained for dozens of years without their guilt being proved.

With the release of the political detainees, Suharto has speculated that he will be able to carry out manipulations and political intrigues in his efforts to strengthen and defend his power. The Indonesian people, however, will certainly guard against these political intrigues of the Suharto regime.

On the international scene, they have tried to cover up their undemocratic, dirty faces in order to ensure that they will continue receiving loans from Western creditor countries. However, they have been widely exposed, particularly by people in those Western creditor countries. But, the former political detainees are not completely free. Tens of thousands of those who had been detained for dozens of years under physical and mental torture before being released are still being restricted, discriminated against and deprived of their political freedom and right to obtain a livelihood. They and their families are facing serious difficulties.

We, together with the Indonesian people, welcome their return to society and salute them for their sacrifices and struggles during their dozens of years in jails and concentration camps. We support their endeavors and struggles to overcome the new difficulties they are confronting. We, together with the Indonesian people, demand that restrictions and discrimination against the released political detainees be removed and that they be given full rights as Indonesian citizens as provided for in Article 27 of the 1945 Constitution.

"we" not  
have live  
comfortable  
in PRC!  
1965!

We, and whoever else has a feeling of justice, demand that all political prisoners, still detained in jails and detention camps, as well as those who have been unfairly sentenced, be immediately and unconditionally released.

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The reactionary clique continues to instigate anti-Chinese racism in the country. Their action is parallel to the criminal aim of the Soviet and Vietnamese hegemonists to split the unity of peoples in Southeast Asian countries. The reactionary racists have tried to draw a lesson from and copy the barbaric anti-Chinese Vietnamese authorities, who expelled hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese and Vietnamese of Chinese origin and put them to sea after extorting and robbing them.

We must prevent such a tragedy from happening in Indonesia, since it would seriously harm the national interests of the Indonesian people. We must adopt a policy of national unity and equality for all citizens without discriminating against their tribal and other ethnological origins, religious and political beliefs, and guarantee their fundamental human rights in accordance with the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila. The Indonesian people must heighten their vigilance and strengthen their unity to combat the racist policy seeking to split national unity, which will only benefit the reactionary clique and the ambitious Soviet hegemonists.

The recent international situation is tumultuous, tense and complicated. The rivalry to dominate the world between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is sharpening.

The Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and its threats against Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries were followed by the open Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which has threatened Pakistan and Iran and the entire Persian Gulf and Middle East region and has led to a serious international crisis. The danger of a war spreading, which could lead to a new world war, has become obvious and the main source of the danger of such a war is Soviet hegemonism.

Using the slogan of socialism, Marxism-Leninism and natural allies, and by pretending to support the struggle of people throughout the world against U.S., Western European and Japanese imperialism, the Soviet social-imperialists tried to trick and deceive the peoples of the world. The Soviet Union's propaganda of detente attempts to divert people's attention from its own aggressive acts, which have made the situation worse rather than better.

But, its support of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and its own invasion in Afghanistan have opened the eyes of people to the aggressive features of the Soviet social-imperialists. People throughout the world have denounced the Soviet and Vietnamese aggression. They are becoming aware that it is no different from the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia, which formed part of the Soviet occupation of East European countries, Mongolia and the Japanese northern islands. The occupation of Eastern Europe is directed against Western Europe, while the occupation of Mongolia and Japanese northern islands is directed against China and Japan.

By using Cuba and Vietnam, the Soviet Union has also carried out military infiltration of African and Asian countries, such as Angola, Ethiopia and the Indochina countries, and turned them into stepping stones for broadening its expansion on the two continents. Through an aggressive collusion with Vietnam under the cloak of friendship and cooperation, including military cooperation, the Soviet Union has encouraged the Vietnamese hegemonists and expansionists, who placed Laos and Kampuchea under their control. By using this method, the Soviet Union has tried to dominate Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca and at the same time has carried out an anti-China policy because it regards China as the biggest obstacle to its hegemonist ambition.



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Under these circumstances, it would be a grave mistake and dangerous to regard Vietnam, which has ambitions of regional hegemonism supported by the Soviet Union, as a buffer zone against the so-called Chinese threat from the north. It is the Soviet Union and Vietnam which constitutes a direct threat to the security, territorial integrity, national independence and people's sovereignty of countries in Southeast Asia.

In facing this situation, the peoples and countries in Southeast Asia, firmly upholding the principles of self-determination and opposing all outside interference, are united in supporting the Kampuchean people's struggle against the Vietnamese invasion and the Afghan people's struggle against Soviet aggression. The peoples and countries in Southeast Asia are united in heightening their vigilance against the danger of Soviet aggression, either directly or through the use of Vietnamese troops. They are aware of the position of Southeast Asia as one of the zones of rivalry and a target of Soviet global strategy apart from its strategic targets in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region.

It is a fact that once Soviet and Vietnamese aggressor troops invade the territory of another sovereign state, they will never withdraw voluntarily. Therefore, the demand for the so-called political and peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean and Afghan conflicts without the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese and Soviet troops from the two countries means the recognition of the Heng Samrin and the Babrak Karmal regimes, which are opposed by the people of both countries, and the justification of the Soviet and Vietnamese aggression.

The weak attitude reflected in the so-called political and peaceful settlement is in reality similar to the attitude taken during the Munich pact which led to an even bigger disaster.

The Soviet Union has recently intensified its energetic efforts to infiltrate and dig its claws into Indonesia. The Soviet Union is waiting for an opportunity to dominate Indonesia by cultivating Indonesian revisionist renegades and other pro-Soviet groups in various fields--including certain press circles which they can influence--as well as political circles, civil and military officials through shrewd, refined methods and bribery and by exploiting the dissatisfaction among the people of various strata against the Suharto regime.

This situation calls for all forces who love the motherland to strengthen unity, heighten vigilance and make the necessary preparations to confront the danger of Soviet and Vietnamese hegemonism to defend national independence and sovereignty. Unity and vigilance must also be strengthened and heightened against the dangerous role of their lackeys who have both openly and secretly intensified their activities.

The Vietnamese claim over Indonesian territory off the Natuna Islands is like a cymbal which has awakened the Indonesian people. Soviet war ships roaming the South China Sea from their bases at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and in the Indian Ocean by way of the Straits of Malacca pose a real threat to the Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia.

In the international arena, people throughout the world and the Third World countries have carried out unyielding struggles against the two superpowers--the Soviet Union and the United States--to defend their rights for independence, political and economic freedom, control and exploitation of their natural resources as well as their right to conduct international trade. The nonaligned movement, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, constitutes an effective force to fight domination, suppression, subversion, intervention and aggression by the superpowers.



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Since the nature of Soviet aggression has become obvious, peoples and countries throughout the world have strengthened their unity and heightened their vigilance against the danger of Soviet hegemonism in order to prevent a new world war and to safeguard peace.

The People's Republic of China is playing an active and major role in the international arena to unify all forces that can be unified to launch the struggle. The grand endeavor of the Chinese people to launch the four modernizations socialist development program will also raise its capability and contribution to the struggle and strengthen the support of the struggles of peoples of various countries for national liberation, democracy and socialism.

The current objective situation at home has encouraged the Indonesian people from various strata and groups, workers, peasants, fishermen, poor urban dwellers, intellectuals, cultural workers, youths and students, patriotic and democratic forces of various political beliefs to strengthen their unity against the political suppression and economic exploitation by the imperialists, bureaucratic capitalists and feudal landlords represented by the Suharto regime in order to ensure their democratic rights and social justice, complete independence and national freedom. *rather vague target*

Developments on the international scene, particularly the situation in Southeast Asia, have encouraged all patriotic and democratic forces to heighten vigilance and strengthen national unity against growing Soviet hegemonism to defend Indonesian national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The situation at home and in the international arena at present demands that Indonesian communists be firmly united, hard working, diligent, persevering, courageous and careful in rebuilding the PKI as a Marxist-Leninist party which can fulfill its historical mission to lead the Indonesian people's liberation struggle. *where MIT*

Guided by the directives and principles of strategy and tactics for the Indonesian revolution, as mentioned in the Politburo self-criticism and the party program for the Indonesian people's democracy, the PKI must be intelligent and energetic in determining concrete policies and tactics in line with the objective and subjective conditions based on concrete analysis of the situation of the party as well as domestic developments in relation to the international situation. The present task of Indonesian communists and revolutions is to foster close relations with the masses and join them in their struggle. They must be able to adopt measures in line with the objective conditions and the level of consciousness of the masses. They must develop and gradually promote the struggle of the masses. *vague*

Only when the PKI can correctly assess its experiences and overcome its weaknesses, will the masses place their trust in the PKI, which is a source of strength that can never be destroyed. We must unceasingly eliminate subjectivism, the past mistakes of PKI opportunists and revisionists and the greed and [word indistinct] of the small bourgeoisie, which have seriously damaged the party and revolution. The party must carefully study the great changes in the economic and political fields and in class relations within Indonesian society. The party must study the growth of the new feudal landlords, the bureaucratic capitalists and compradors as well as their links with the imperialists. The party must also study the conditions of all classes within Indonesian society which have been economically and politically exploited by the imperialists, [word indistinct], compradors and feudal landlords.

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Based on the concrete analysis of the situation of the classes and their inter-relations within Indonesian society, we can determine the correct and acceptable political line, tactics and directives to wage the struggle. In short, the whole party must seriously study, master and implement Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, not in a dogmatic, but creative way. The party has to solve the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought with the concrete conditions and situation of Indonesian revolution toward victory. In recalling the experiences of the PKI over the past 60 years, we bow our heads in deep respect to the hundreds of thousands of Indonesian communist fighters, patriots and democratic elements from all ranks who have wholeheartedly sacrificed their lives in the great struggle for the liberation of the Indonesian people.

We salute all communists, patriots and democratic elements from various political and religious beliefs as well as tribal origins who, under difficult conditions, continue to wage their struggle for a progressive and democratic Indonesia. On this occasion, we convey most sincere thanks from the Indonesian communists and revolutionary people for the solidarity shown by the communists, progressive elements and revolutionary people throughout the world who have given much support and encouragement to the Indonesian communists, patriots, democratic elements and all revolutionary people in their struggle.

Unite, all forces of the Indonesian people! Fight for democratic rights and social justice, for complete independence and national liberation! Unite, all patriotic and democratic forces! Fight the threat of Soviet hegemonism against Indonesia! Long live the PKI! Long live Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought!

[Signed] The delegation of the PKI. Chairman: (Yusuf Ajitorop,) secretary of the Central Committee and member of the PKI Central Committee Politburo.

23 May 1980.

- repeated recognition of mistakes & weakness of P.
- party program focus on study, rather than action - after study, correct line can be set.
- nothing on armed struggle
- heavy support for PRC foreign policy formulation
- can't supt for MITI, but PKI is to be built up as an m-l party

ational Intelligence Officers

19 June 1980

25X4 Dear Mr.

I apologize for the delay in getting this information to you -- I put your name and address in a jacket which I haven't worn since the Young President's Meeting. Anyway I hope that this will be of use to you.


Sincerely,

STAT

NIO for East Asia

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
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on  
Soviet-American Cooperation  
in the  
Northeast Asian Region  
June 20, 1980

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